Open letter to Jimmy Carter
from
Jonathn Simon's open letter to Jimmy Carter:
I also am aware of the recent position you have taken in support of paper receipts as a solution to the verifiability issue.
While VVPT is a deceptively appealing solution and one which is likely to garner substantial bipartisan support, it will fail to prevent massive computerized
vote rigging. Permit me to explain the reasons for this.
To begin with, the paper trail is worthless unless it is in fact counted. That the voter can compare the screen with his or her receipt is no safeguard
in itself, since any computer can be readily programmed to display and print out one thing and store or transmit something else.
If the paper receipts are used for recount or audit purposes (as opposed to as the original ballot of record) a recount or audit can be avoided entirely
by creating a margin greater than the audit/recount threshold.
There are numerous other administrative gambits capable of thwarting a candidate's (and certainly the public's) efforts to obtain a fair recount.
In Ohio in 2004, for example, the recount process was manipulated by Secretary of State Blackwell and the equipment vendors themselves so that initial audits
were cherry-picked rather than done at random as mandated by law, and as a result only one county out of 88 proceeded to a full hand recount. Or, put another
way, over 95% of the available paper receipts were never counted in Ohio.
It is clear that for paper receipts to be meaningful, the law must mandate recount on demand and without the levying of prohibitive fees to the petitioners
(see New Mexico 2004). If this were established, we would witness the recounting of virtually every competitive election, including of course all battleground
states in the presidential contest. Election Day will become Election Month and quite possible Election Season, as the counting drags on (see Florida 2000,
Ohio 2004) and multiple litigations no doubt ensue. Not a pretty picture.
Having followed the steps to this point, and recognizing that nothing short of full recount on demand will render the paper receipts effective, does it
not make infinitely more sense simply to count the paper once on Election Night, post the results in writing at the precinct, and create a written tabulation
tree from the precinct to the county to the state level which must be reconciled prior to certification of the results?
Understanding the
difference between paper ballots and paper audit trails
by Gary Beckwith
March 20, 2005
With all the pending legislation in Congress designed to fix our electoral system, it is important for concerned citizens to learn and understand just what
the bills would require and what they wouldn't.
One key issue is how the various bills attempt to prevent fraud by requiring a "paper trail" on computerized voting machines. In order to understand just
how the bills accomplish this, and judge whether or not they solve the problem, it is important to recognize the difference between a Voter-Verified Paper
Ballot (VVPB) and a Voter-Verifield Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT).
All the current legislation calls for VVPAT, not VVPB. But does it make a difference?
Here is why the distinction makes a world of difference. Let's start by looking at how an electronic voting machine equipped with a VVPAT printer works.
This system is permitted even if the pending legislation is passed. When you cast your vote on one of these systems, two separate things are created —
your electronic ballot, which is used to decide who won the election, and your "Paper Audit Trail," which is held in case of an audit or a recount. You
are able to view the Paper Audit Trail, and make sure it is correct. You have no way of knowing what your electronic ballot says. You can feel relatively
certain that if there is a hand recount, your vote will be counted properly. But since hand recounts are very rare, when you look at that piece of paper,
you are not actually verifying your vote. There is still nothing verifying that your actual vote was correct.
The following illustration demonstrates how a VVPAT system works:
In contrast, some legislation on the state level calls for a Voter-Verified Paper Ballot (VVPB). This type of legislation goes a step further, by requiring
that the piece of paper is actually used to count the votes in the first count, not merely to be there in case of a hand recount. In fact, VVPB legislation
removes one key step in the voting process that is otherwise extremely vulerable to hacking and fraud. DRE (Direct Recording Electronic) voting machines
become illegal. The following illustration demonstrates how requiring a VVPB would prevent electronic voting machines from casting an unverified ballot:
The bottom line is that VVPAT legislation aims at making recounts possible, while VVPB legislation focuses more on getting the first count right. Question
to reader - after the last 2 elections, how do you feel about relying on recounts to ensure our votes were counted properly?
This demonstrates that the current VVPAT legislation falls short in a key area. However, we should still support the bills. Having at least a possibility
of a recount is certainly better than what we have now — nearly 35% of our national vote is paperless and can not be recounted. And that number would likely
grow if none of the bills pass. But don't get your hopes up; there is a good possibility the Republicans will prevent these bills from getting out of committee
and they may never even be voted on.
Since VVPB legislation is preferable to anyone who cares about the integrity of the voting system, why has not a single Senator or Congressperson at least
proposed legislation calling for a paper ballot?
We can only wonder.
Things to note:
Rush Holt's bill HR550 attempts to address the issue that the VVPATs are not used in the first count, by randomly selecting 2% of the papers and checking
them against the votes that were cast by the machines. Many have called into question whether 2% is enough to detect fraud, and as well the question of
how to ensure the check is truly random is significant.
This article focuses on one key issue in electronic voting. The reader should not infer that VVPB legislation alone will prevent all computer voting
fraud. Legislation that requires a VVPB can still allow for computerized machines to count the paper ballots and central tabulators to total the counts,
unless these things are also specifically prohibited in the bill.